Will there be Nuclear Weapons on the Moon? Maybe.

In December of 2020, President Trump authorized the creation of a new military, the Space Force. What initially sounds like the reincarnation of President Regan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars,” is strangely enough based off of the concept of shooting down nuclear missiles from space, with the added desire of expanding the US space presence. Some of Space Force’s new defense initiatives, such as having a missile warning spacecraft in earth’s orbit, directly challenge the established environment of cold-war era deterrence. Why then does the Biden administration feel that it is necessary to engage in further deterrence measures, when his administration signed a denuclearization treaty with Russia on February 3rd? Frankly, what is the future of nuclear weapons in outer space?

In the 20th century, the environment of nuclear deterrence rested on a few key principles, which nuclear protection runs against. If one state (United States) shot a missile at another state (Soviet Union), the recipient nation ensured that the aggressor would receive a missile in return. This is otherwise known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and relied on the ability of states to have a second strike capability — to send the return missile. However, initiatives like the SDI and having missile warning spacecraft violate this mutual destruction, as it allows for states to prevent any destructive capabilities of the adversary nation and nullifies their arsenal. 

Currently, the United States is legally bound to not engage in nuclear activities in space. In 1963, the United States ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), banning all tests of nuclear weapons in Earth’s atmosphere, outer space, and under water. It is worth noting that the United States reserves the right to test nuclear weapons underground, since it has not committed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The PTBT, however, did not address the militarization of space; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty, explicitly prevents this. Ratified in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty is the agreement to not place any nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on any celestial bodies or in Earth’s orbit. Thus, the only time nuclear weapons are allowed to enter space is if they are launched from one nation, sent through Earth’s orbit, and come back down to hit another country — ideally this would never happen. 

A more recent development in nuclear legislation — and perhaps more telling of the Biden administration’s outlook on nuclear weapons — is the recent extension to the New START treaty between the United States and Russia. The extension runs for five years, until 2026. Each nation is limited to 1,550 nuclear warheads each, much less than the 1,700-2,200 warheads of the U.S.-Russian 2002 Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (SORT). However, unlike SORT, START employs the use of a commission to meet twice a year to ensure that each nation is complying with the agreement. Renegotiations of the START treaty stalled last year, due to both the COVID-19 pandemic and the scramble of Biden’s administration taking power. The completion of the treaty extension was an early test for the Biden administration; refusal to cease negotiations signifies that the U.S. government is committed to limiting the nuclear stockpile. Therefore, if both the PTBT and the Outer Space Treaty call for the demilitarization of space, and New START calls for limitations on the nuclear stockpile, why has the US created the Space Force, with the intention of deploying “military space forces”?

Space militarization boils down to one key component, which was either never mentioned or largely skipped by all of the above treaties: deterrence through new, technologically advanced, real-time intelligence capabilities. The goals of the Space Force established in their August 2020 capstone publication indicate that they are willing to militarize space for offensive and defensive capabilities, but mainly identify two fields for immediate development: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA). Both initiatives focus on the usage of spacecraft and satellites as information detection modules for the military, with the objective of obtaining as much information as possible in real time. These intelligence-installations would be able to (theoretically) immediately notify the United States when a missile has been launched on Earth’s surface, and give the government enough time to prepare an appropriate response. By rendering all missile launches on the planet visible to the military, the United States would have significantly more time to prepare a retaliatory launch. Ideally, the usage of ISR and SDA deter antagonistic nations from launching nuclear missiles, since they are unable to gain the element of surprise. 

The proposed ISR and SDA intelligence gathering initiatives are connected through the military, which is an international legal problem. According to the Outer Space Treaty — which the U.S. has ratified — the deployment of military forces in space is only to be done, “exclusively [for] peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.” Since information downlink sources, or satellites that are able to send information down to a base on earth, are going to be promoted and constructed by the military, these operations are in a grey zone of sorts. Do orbital intelligence installations count as military maneuvers? Since they perform the same function as regular NASA satellites, it appears not to be the case. However, it is likely that this distinction does not matter: the image of armed U.S. forces in space is sure to draw ire from other nations, and is likely to lead to  order similar operations from both adversaries and partners. To prevent another Space Race, the engineers that enter space should not be uniformed, and should only represent the U.S. government. 

So what is the future of nuclear operations in space? For now, it appears that the US government is prioritizing intelligence gathering operations, which remains a promising field with minimal legal ramifications if done correctly. Opening up space to military operations by allowing uniformed soldiers to conduct offensive operations, however, can lead to nuclearization. The U.S. government needs to heed its prior treaty obligations and prevent space from becoming militarized. 

Olwyn Kells is a sophomore concentrating in International and Public Affairs and Slavic Studies. She currently serves as a staff writer for the BULR Blog, and can be reached at olwyn_kells@brown.edu.