“The Province of All Mankind”: Rethinking the Outer Space Treaty of ‘67

States have long thought of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967 as a success in international law because of its ability to largely dictate the actions and behaviors of states in space. That said, the past 45 years have witnessed the rapid growth of technology, broadening the opportunity for states to engage with space and drastically changing the landscape that diplomats saw when they originally signed the Treaty in ‘67. With international engagement in space rapidly growing, loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty are becoming abundantly clear, calling for a serious re-evaluation of standing international law. 

Perhaps the most drastic shift in the conversation regarding outer space legislation is sourced in the increasing militarization of space. Over the past decade, countries like China and Russia have developed anti-satellite weapons which, according to a US Defense Report in 2019, can disable satellites in low-orbit [1]. Of the current 5000 satellites in orbit, 3000 have been disabled or are no longer effective [2]. Further, as the global hacking industry grows more advanced, the threat of manipulating current space infrastructure to gain a military or political advantage has become a pressing issue. Russian officials claimed this year that any hack into a satellite owned by the nation would be considered a cause for war [3].

As it currently stands, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 does not permit the utilization of space for combative militaristic purposes intending harm to  any state. Article IV of the Treaty asserts that celestial bodies can only be utilized by states for peaceful purposes [4]. Further, Article I states that “space exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.” The same article also claims that outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is  “the province of all mankind” [5]. That said, the once collaborative and multilateral attitude towards engagement with outer space has faded, now replaced with a far more competitive and aggressive outlook, particularly amongst large, wealthy nations like the United States and Russia. The notion of acting in the best interest of all states seems now to be a naive idea and an unlikely ambition of many of the Treaty’s signatories. 

This idea has become abundantly clear in the past half-decade. In December of 2019, former President Donald J. Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which, amongst other objectives, created the United States Space Force [6]. The creation of the world’s first branch of an armed service concerned entirely with outer space—and the first American armed service to be added since 1947—became the subject of the hit Netflix comedy “Space Force” because of its publicly-perceived absurdity. That said, the Act passed 377-48 in the Democratic-held House and 86-8 in the Republican Senate, reflecting bipartisanly-held fears about the future of space security [7]. Sources of the Act’s overwhelming support were widespread: it came in response to recent attempts by Russia and China to attack or disable American satellites with lasers, fears that the nation could be spied upon via the manipulation of its satellites, and concern regarding their future weaponization. The stated mission of the Space Force speaks to the general shift in the global attitude toward space: “The USSF is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Guardians to conduct global space operations that enhance the way our joint and coalition forces fight while also offering decision-makers military options to achieve national objectives [8]. As Trump argued in his attempts to have the Space Force established, the US wants to assert its dominance and therefore increase its ability to “fight” other states to stem its quest for superiority in outer space [9]. The creation of an armed branch concerned with space shows that nations have begun to anticipate conflict as technology advances and as outer space grows increasingly crowded. 

Much has changed since 1967. Calls for the re-evaluation of the Outer Space Treaty and the adjustment of historical protocol to meet the modern climate appear necessary to prevent instances of intense international conflict. Arguably, the disabling of satellites is evidence of military aggression, which would be deemed illegal under the Treaty but has thus far been treated as private conflicts between states rather than a violation of international law. Should such privatization continue to be the case, there is little to dissuade assuming a more aggressive stance and pushing the boundaries of what is and is not allowed under international law.

Grace Posorske is a sophomore at Brown University, concentrating in International & Public Affairs and Classics. She is a staff writer for the Brown University Undergraduate Law Review and can be contacted at grace_posorske@brown.edu.